• Veraticus@lib.lgbtM
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    1 year ago

    Maybe if their conception of masculinity is so brittle, they should abandon it instead of asking everyone else to conform to it?

  • Veraticus@lib.lgbtM
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    1 year ago

    I’m replying again because I read the article and thought it had some really interesting points!

    And this is the core trouble with the identity of capital-M Men: It ultimately rests on the negation of female identity.

    This is my great concern with men’s liberation and men’s spaces. It’s similar to the problem of whiteness: whiteness is employed as a negation of other identities (that is, Black/POC identity), not a positive assertion of an identity.

    I like that this article discusses this frankly and proposes solutions about finding a masculinity that embraces more fluidity and abandoning fragile conceptions of masculinity as “protecting” and “providing.” Men can be enough in and of themselves without needing to check someone else’s boxes of masculinity. We are (K)enough!

    • spaduf@lemmy.blahaj.zoneOP
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      1 year ago

      And this is the core trouble with the identity of capital-M Men: It ultimately rests on the negation of female identity.

      I am reminded of this passage from Gender Trouble which talks about early feminism’s own history with defining themselves as something other than simply the negation of men.

      In a move that complicates the discussion further, Luce Irigaray argues that women constitute a paradox, if not a contradiction, within the discourse of identity itself.Women are the “sex” which is not “one.” Within a language pervasively masculinist, a phallogocentric language, women constitute the unrepresentable. In other words, women represent the sex that cannot be thought, a linguistic absence and opacity. Within a language that rests on univocal signification, the female sex constitutes the unconstrainable and undesignatable. In this sense, women are the sex which is not “one,” but multiple. In opposition to Beauvoir, for whom women are designated as the Other, Irigaray argues that both the subject and the Other are masculine mainstays of a closed phallogocentric signifying economy that achieves its totalizing goal through the exclusion of the feminine altogether. For Beauvoir, women are the negative of men, the lack against which masculine identity differentiates itself; for Irigaray, that particular dialectic constitutes a system that excludes an entirely different economy of signification. Women are not only represented falsely within the Sartrian frame of signifying-subject and signified-Other, but the falsity of the signification points out the entire structure of representation as inadequate.The sex which is not one, then, provides a point of departure for a criticism of hegemonic Western representation and of the metaphysics of substance that structures the very notion of the subject.